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Abstract 
 
Big Data (BD) has the potential to ‘disrupt’ the senior management of organisations, 
prompting directors to make decisions more rapidly and to shape their capabilities to 
address environmental changes. This paper explores whether, how and to what extent 
BD has disrupted the process of board level decision-making. Drawing upon both the 
knowledge-based view, and cognitive and dynamic capabilities, we undertook in-depth 
interviews with directors involved in high-level strategic decision-making. Our data 
reveal important findings in three areas. First, we find evidence of a shortfall in 
cognitive capabilities in relation to BD, and issues with cognitive biases and cognitive 
overload. Second, we reveal the challenges to board cohesion presented by BD. Finally, 
we show how BD impacts on responsibility/control within senior teams. This study 
points to areas for development at three levels of our analysis: individual directors, the 
board, and a broader view of the organisation with its external stakeholders. 
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Highlights 
 
 There is a shortfall in directors’ capabilities for dealing with Big Data. 
 Board cohesion can be disrupted by Big Data, compromising the decision-
making process. 
 Boards need to develop cognitive capabilities and find new ways to make 
decisions in the Big Data era. 
 Big Data provides firms with opportunities to enhance their adaptive 
capabilities. 
 Boards need to work in new ways to meet the challenges that Big Data can 
present. 
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1. Introduction 
The potential of new technologies to ‘disrupt’ the management of organisations, 
including at the most senior levels, has recently been noted by many scholars (e.g. 
Evans, 2017; Abbasi, Sarker, & Chiang, 2016; Valentine & Stewart, 2013). One 
striking example of this disruptive effect is the challenging role played by ‘Big Data’ 
(BD) for directors and decision-makers (Janssen, van der Voort., & Wahyudi, 2017). 
The sudden rise of BD as a new knowledge source has prompted corporate decision-
makers to make decisions more rapidly and to shape their capabilities to proactively 
address environmental changes (Fosso Wamba, Akter, Edwards, Chopin, & Gnanzou, 
2015).  
Despite considerable research on making strategic (important, novel and resource 
hungry) decisions and the characteristics of these processes (Hickson, Butler, Cray, 
Mallory, & Wilson, 1986; Whittington, Cailluet , & Yakis-Douglas, 2011), there is little 
research on how BD has influenced the way decisions are made, on the impact of data 
proliferation on strategic responsibilities (Chari, Katsikeas, Balabanis, & Robson, 
2012; Quinn, Dibb, Simkin, Canhoto, & Analogbei, 2016), or on how these data are 
handled at board level (Nutt & Wilson, 2010). A previous empirical study (Hickson, 
Miller, & Wilson, 2003) has identified the ‘knowledge base’ used by UK senior 
managers to inform their strategic decision-making as the single most important factor 
in the decision’s success. However, while this was a large study with 55 UK cases, it 
mainly spanned a period where information for decisions was largely well-known 
(extant knowledge), available in hard copy as reports (explicit knowledge), or resided 
in managers’ heads based on their experience or judgement (implicit or tacit 
knowledge).  
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The explosion of knowledge which has accompanied increasing access to BD 
arguably has a large impact on both how and what information senior managers use to 
inform their decision-making. A key research question is whether or not BD has 
changed the process of board level decision-making and, if so, how and to what extent? 
Our research addresses this question at three levels: first, we consider the implications 
of BD for individual directors; second, we explore BD’s influence on the way that the 
board works; third, we review the impact of BD for the wider organisation and its 
external stakeholders. Knowledge Based View (KBV) is selected as a suitable 
theoretical framework because it helps us to understand why a “[l]ack of knowledge 
about BD sources influences decision-making quality” (Janssen et al., 2017, p. 339). 
For example, previous research (e.g. Raghunathan, 1999) confirms that the decision-
making quality improves when directors have greater knowledge of the relationships 
among problem variables. 
 
2. Theoretical approach 
We situate our research approach to draw from KBV. In doing so, we explore the 
implications of BD for strategic decision-making undertaken by the board. For the 
purposes of our approach, we follow McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012) by regarding BD 
datasets as being characterised by high levels of volume, velocity and variety. As such, 
BD is defined by dataset size (Erevelles, Fukawa, & Swayne 2016; George, Osinga, 
Lavie, & Scott, 2016) and the challenges these data place on computing capacity (Fosso 
Wamba, Gunasekaran, Akter, Ren, Dubey, &, Childe, 2017).  
In viewing strategic decision-making as a process of making choices under varying 
conditions of uncertainty (Milliken, 1987; Petrakis, Kostis, & Kafka 2016), the 
decision-making literature cites a lack of information as a key source of uncertainty 
(Nutt & Wilson, 2010). In the BD era, a lack of information is transformed into an 
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abundance, with the potential to reshape data into usable information (Tihanyi, Graffin, 
& George, 2014). As such, these data offer the potential to reduce decision-making risk 
and improve strategic decision-making by allowing senior leadership teams to take a 
more holistic view (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2010).  
However, while there is little doubt that the BD explosion is being felt in wider 
society, in business relationships, and in crafting public policy; much less is known 
about its impact on the behaviours of senior managers taking decisions that matter. 
Since strategic decisions are typically defined as those that are without precedent in the 
organisation, they are costly in terms of financial and human resources; they are also 
inherently complex (Hickson et al., 1986; Hendry, 2000). There is rarely one best 
solution, rather a series of possible solutions, and each solution is a result of trade-offs 
and priorities in balancing risk and control (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Although 
McAfee and Brynjolfsson (2012) suggest that profitability and productivity benefits 
ensue when BD is applied, these authors do not investigate the processes by which this 
occurs, nor how senior managers make data part of their decision-making routines. This 
gap highlights a key area for investigation.  
The advent of BD has also spurred changes to board processes and structures with 
potential consequences for how strategic decisions are made. Chief Data Officers, Chief 
Information Officers or Chief Analytics Officer (Côrte-Real, Oliveira, & Ruivo, 2016; 
Fosso Wamba et al., 2015) are defined as a new breed of executive that some leading 
organisations are seeking to hire to improve their usage of BD in decision-making (Lee 
Madnick, Wang, Wang, & Zhang, 2014). There is also evidence of boards moving away 
from top-down planning; instead processing large amounts of digital data, adopting 
techniques such as competency modelling (drawing on the resource-based view of the 
firm) and real-options analysis (drawing on financial strategy) (Camillus, 2008). The 
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complexity of the decisions being made and of the data being used, which may induce 
feelings of certainty or bewilderment and prompt decision-makers to take highly risky 
decisions, is worthy of attention. As Camillus (2008, p.17) notes, boards have problems 
because they ‘can’t develop models of the increasingly complex environment in which 
they operate’. This juxtaposition of ‘big problems’ and ‘BD’ provides a further area for 
investigation. 
We adopt a knowledge-based view (KBV) to situate the research and guide the 
analysis (Nonaka, 1994; Spender & Grant, 1996; Felin & Hesterly, 2007). KBV 
scholars take an extensive view of data as a key resource in decision-making – a view 
theoretically articulated and empirically revealed in research taking a resource-based 
view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Priem & Butler, 2001; Barney, 2001). We argue 
that data can be viewed as a key resource which may be mobilised around decisions or 
incorporated into organisational intelligence as a more latent routine (with the potential 
for use in later decisions). For example, Collinson and Wilson (2006) empirically 
demonstrated the creation of latent routines via knowledge acquisition as a key feature 
of successful Japanese organisations. 
The KBV is not, however, unproblematic. As Spender and Grant (1996, p.48) 
observed, we need ‘a clear statement of the epistemology which gives it (knowledge) 
meaning’. We also take the view that a single theory of knowledge is possibly untenable 
because of the many different types and definitions of knowledge. However, 
approaching the question of how knowledge is utilised (as in this paper) and not solely 
an examination of what knowledge is, avoids definitional plurality debates around 
knowledge (Spender & Grant, 1996). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) capture the plurality 
of knowledge as either explicit or tacit on the one hand, or on the other, how it is situated 
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at various levels of analysis (from the individual, to group to organisational and inter-
organisational levels).  
To unpack the plurality of the KBV, this paper explores the key determinants of 
knowledge at three different levels: the director/individual level (managerial cognitive 
capabilities); the board level (behavioural factors); and the stakeholders’ level (dynamic 
capabilities). These three perspectives – cognitive capabilities, a behavioural view and 
dynamic capabilities – all sit comfortably within a KBV-based approach, because they 
seek to explain the antecedents and consequences of knowledge. Capabilities refer to 
the ability to use knowledge (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009) 
that – as a key resource – affects the ways in which the board behaves. In particular, 
the extant literature accepts that in today’s turbulent environment, companies need to 
continuously improve and re-shape their knowledge to respond promptly to external 
pressures (Lin & Wu 2014; Wu 2010). Knowledge as a unique and distinctive resource 
provides the ‘basic foundations to renew or re-configure its resource base’ (Côrte-Real 
et al., 2016, p. 380) and to build capabilities. 
Managerial cognitive capabilities (at individual/director level), behavioural factors 
(at the board level) and dynamic capabilities (at the stakeholders’ level) are 
interdependent concepts of the KBV framework. Grant (1996) considers organisations 
as entities where specialised knowledge of individuals (directors) is integrated to form 
organisational-level or group-level knowledge that can in turn lead to sustainable 
competitive advantage. Previous research (Helfat & Peteraf 2015) documents that 
managerial cognitive capabilities, behavioural factors and dynamic capabilities affect 
the quality of decisions, as these capabilities facilitate the early recognition of 
environmental threats or opportunities that can impact on the quality of the decision-
making process. Therefore, in the context of BD, a focus on managerial cognitive 
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capabilities (at individual/director level), behavioural factors (at the board level) and 
dynamic capabilities (at the stakeholder level) allows the researcher to explore whether 
and how BD are part of the set of capabilities and knowledge that companies and 
decision-makers need to develop. 
At the individual level, directors and managers need to develop the mental models 
and skills, or managerial cognitive capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015), to perceive, 
analyse and process changes in the environment. This cognitive process has been 
defined as ‘cognitive complexity’ (Schneier, 1979), and the literature notes it may lead 
to cognitive biases (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993), such as anchoring (i.e. old way of 
thinking), cognitive dissonance (i.e. holding conflicting beliefs or ideas) (Brennan & 
Conroy, 2013). The lack of cognitive capabilities can also cause boardroom or 
organisational inertia (Tripsas & Gavetti 2000). The cognitive view (Chaston & Sadler-
Smith, 2012) offers important insights into why directors may act conservatively, 
clinging on to more traditional processes which have been institutionalised since the 
pre-digital era. In particular, cognitive capabilities are especially enhanced in an 
uncertain and complex environment characterised by rapid changes (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson, 2001).  
At the board level, a key concept in understanding boardroom behaviour concerns 
the notion of routines (Grant, 1996). Routines consist mainly of knowledge that is tacit 
and hard to codify (van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009); they refer to behaviour that 
is learned, repeated and rooted in tacit knowledge (Winter, 2003). Additionally, we note 
that routines at the boardroom level are related to cognitive capabilities (at the 
individual/director level). Routines ‘conserve the cognitive abilities of board members 
and […] they direct attention to selected aspects of identified problem situations; […] 
they also create decision-making biases’ (van Ees et al., 2009, p. 312). A KBV 
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perspective is consistent with the view that boardrooms use stocks of knowledge, 
routines and capabilities to take actions (Balogun & Jenkins, 2003). When exploring 
how boards process BD, it is essential to consider decision-making behaviour. A key 
factor, over and above the availability and type of data, is how the board uses it to make 
decisions; this may be the most influential factor of all. Behavioural Economists, such 
as Kahneman (2011), state that no matter how complex, refined or available data may 
be, decision-makers are unlikely to fully consider it, and so often make inaccurate 
decisions.  
At the stakeholder level, companies are expected to proactively respond to 
environmental changes by correctly anticipating the stakeholders’ needs (Wang 
Senaratne, & Rafiq, 2015). Dynamic capabilities encompass the ability to secure new 
and additional knowledge, by empowering decision-makers to proactively address 
environmental changes (Oliver, 2016; Reeves & Deimler, 2011). The firm’s ability to 
update and reconfigure its competencies (dynamic capabilities) includes reshaping and 
reinventing existing and novel knowledge to respond to external changes (Teece, 1998; 
Ambrosini, Bowman, & Collier, 2009; Barrales-Molina, Bustinza, & Gutierrez-
Gutierrez, 2013) and to seek to shape its environment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). As 
BD provides new insights into environmental trends, its use can improve dynamic 
capabilities by supporting corporate decision-makers in being responsive and adaptive 
to current dynamic environmental demands (Erevelles et al., 2016). As a result, 
organisations need to ‘integrate, build and reconfigure’ competencies to meet the 
environmental changes BD highlights (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, p. 515). BD 
processes should also become part of firms’ dynamic capabilities (Braganza, Brooks, 
Nepelski, Ali, & Moro, 2017) and of the decision-making process (Davenport, Barth, 
& Bean, 2012). The use of external knowledge through absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
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Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998) fosters the flexibility needed to cope with 
dynamic environments (Ambrosini & Bowman, 2009). We claim that this acquisition 
and use of external knowledge requires the organisation to develop its absorptive 
capacity, based on its previous knowledge, the cognitive capabilities of its directors and 
the behavioural pattern adopted in the boardroom. 
This paper addresses the research gap identified by McAfee and Brynjolfsson 
(2012) and George et al. (2016), for scholars to empirically examine the impact of BD 
on decision-makers. Drawing on the KBV, three analytical lenses are used to 
investigate how boards take strategic decisions in the light of BD. First, we view BD as 
a knowledge asset for the board; secondly, we propose that this asset, although 
necessary, is not sufficient and may vary in its value depending upon cognitive and 
dynamic capabilities; and thirdly, we introduce behavioural factors to the study of 
decision-making activities. 
 
3. Methodology 
This research applies a blend of inductive and deductive processes (Graebner, 
Martin, & Roundy, 2012) to critically evaluate the views of board directors about BD’s 
impact on strategic decision-making. We conducted semi-structured interviews without 
specific constructs in mind; following Rötzmeier-Keuper, Hendricks, Wünderlich, & 
Schitmz's (2018) approach, data was analysed using standard thematic qualitative 
coding techniques. However, during the data analysis, definitions and themes were 
drawn from the existing literature (e.g. Graebner, 2009). During the analysis process, 
the impact of BD on strategic decision-making emerged from the data. Therefore, the 
inductive approach mentioned above refers to our process of data analysis, rather than 
the overall research design per se. Our results are emergent from the data, but later 
compared with the extant literature to make sense of the findings. Data sources included 
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key-informant interviews and secondary-sourced materials and artefacts. Key-
informant interviews with 20 directors followed a semi-structured checklist of issues 
derived from the research questions (see Appendix A). This format allowed a free-
flowing conversation, in which the pre-determined issues of importance could be 
explored in depth, supported by follow-up questioning. The interviews focused on the 
impact of BD on board level decision-making. Among the topics covered were the 
informants’ previous and current roles; organisation profile; role of the board and its 
members; governance and strategy processes; use of data in decision-making; 
complexity and uncertainty in the decision-making environment; role of stakeholders; 
and the potential benefits and challenges associated with BD. Most interviews were 
conducted by at least two research team members, increasing the opportunity to ask 
questions and gain insights from witnessing the data gathering first hand. All interviews 
were audio recorded and transcribed. Contemporaneous field notes were taken and 
checked following each interview. The interview length ranged from 90 to 150 minutes, 
yielding a data set of over forty hours of material.  
Secondary data analysis increasingly is used in corporate governance (Ravasi & 
Zattoni, 2006; Bailey & Peck, 2013) and management studies (He and Baruch, 2010; 
Hajro, Gibson, & Pudelko, 2017). Among the secondary data gathered were annual 
reports, corporate governance reports, social corporate sustainability reports, company 
websites, AGM reports, minutes and transcriptions, and press reports from 2008 to 
2017. These insights supported our interpretation of the emerging themes concerning 
BD’s role and impact on governance and board decision-making. The use of multiple 
sources contributes to the reliability and validity of the data and lessens the risk of 
common method bias (Jakobsen & Jensen, 2015).  
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3.1. Key-informant selection 
Reflecting the managerial focus of the study and research questions, the use of 
convenience sampling and key-informant interviews (Mitchell, 1983; 1994) were 
deemed appropriate (Gill & Johnson, 2010). Access was gained to directors of UK-
based global manufacturing and service organisations using a combination of personal 
networks and snowball sampling (Lecy, Mergel, & Schmitz., 2014). All sampled board 
members were routinely involved in high-level strategic decision-making, enabling a 
rich understanding of the issues. The informants willingly participated in the study, 
indicating high levels of interest in the BD topic. The nature and scope of the research 
questions required high-level access to gain reliable information (Phillips, 1981). 
Achieving this level of access to senior informants for lengthy interviews is rare 
(Zattoni, Douglas, & Judge, 2013), such that the board level of organisational access 
achieved is a distinctive feature of our study. Indeed, there is a general consensus in 
managerial studies noting the difficulty of gaining access to managerial elites (Leblanc 
& Schwartz, 2007; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella Jr., 2003) 
for qualitative studies. 
Among those interviewed were CEOs, Managing Directors, and Global Heads of 
Digital, from sectors including: financial services; management consultancy; FMCG 
manufacturing; air travel; information technology; and leisure (see Table 1). The 
identities of those involved are disguised to protect personal and commercial interests 
(Kirkup & Carrigan, 2000). As our approach was inductive and used a non-probability 
sampling method, it was not our aim to generalise across organisations or sectors. 
However, the breadth of coverage enabled us to evidence empirically common issues 
associated with Big Data’s impact on how strategic decisions are made at the board 
level within diverse contexts.  
13 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2. Data analysis  
The credibility of our research is supported through the rigorous application of 
methods appropriate to the research questions, and through the robust approach used to 
gather the required data. The sampling of experienced directors adds to the face validity 
of our primary data. Sampling from a range of organisation types and sectors also gives 
‘maximum variation’ across the sample (Miles & Huberman, 1994), while maintaining 
focus on the main research questions. Following saturation, where no additional 
insights emerged from the data (Strauss, 1987), no further interviews were conducted. 
These features support the reliability of the findings (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 
2014).  
The core categories from the analysis of our data were initially generated using an 
open-coding approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Drawing on the principles of 
investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1989), four research team members were involved 
in the data analysis to help minimise bias, increasing confidence in the plausibility of 
the results. Using a preliminary set of openly coded data as a basis for subsequent 
coding, a second researcher then used Nvivo12 to independently analyse the data, 
assigning a subset of interrelated axial codes to the core category of open codes in a 
process which ‘broke the data apart and delineated concepts to stand for the blocks of 
raw data’ (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 198). Throughout, the interview texts were 
systematically analysed to reveal a number of ‘categories, types and relationships of 
meaning’ (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012, p. 52). During the final stages, the open 
and emerging axial codes were independently reviewed by other research team 
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members (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman, & Pedersen, 2013). Working together, three 
researchers then reviewed the results to identify any discrepancies in what we label our 
core categories and sub-themes, until an acceptable level of reliability was achieved 
(Hodson, 1999; Hruschka Schwartz, Cobb St. John, Picone-Decaro, Jenkins, & Carey, 
2004).  
Following Eisenhardt (1989), throughout the process we referred to the existing 
literature to continuously refine the inductive theoretical insights. Intercoder reliability 
(Krippendorff, 2004) and intercoder agreement (Campbell et al., 2013) were maximised 
by the fourth researcher, who independently coded the data to verify redundancies, 
reveal discrepancies, check coding reliability and identify any new categories or 
potential sub-themes. Finally, the research team systematically reviewed and agreed a 
set of finally selected core categories and sub-sub-themes, strengthening the reliability 
of the findings.  
The analysis generated three core categories (cognitive capabilities, board 
cohesion, and responsibility and control) and eight sub-themes (shortfall in cognitive 
capability, cognitive biases, cognitive overload, decision-making disruption, temporal 
issues, board composition issues, organisational impact of sub-groups and external 
stakeholders), used to frame our findings (Fig. 1). The researchers identified 166 
quotations for the first core category Cognitive capabilities; 101 quotations for the 
second core category Board cohesion; and 76 quotations for the third core category 
Responsibility and control. Table 2 shows in more detail the number of quotations for 
each core category and sub-theme in order to aid transparency in the presentation of our 
findings. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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A record of notes and memos taken throughout was maintained. The analysis of the 
secondary data was additionally used to supplement the primary data findings, 
reflecting the need to ensure trustworthiness in qualitative research (Bonoma, 1985).  
 
 
4. Findings 
 
4.1. First core category: cognitive capabilities 
As a knowledge-based resource, we expect BD to trigger the dynamic and adaptive 
capabilities that support strategic decision-making. We find that this process’s 
effectiveness relies on the efficient integration of BD resources (the data itself) and BD 
capabilities (the technical ability to capture and manipulate it). Most informants 
recognised the role that BD could play in this process. As one director commented, 
‘…they’ve all got a realisation they have specific issues and they recognise that 
collecting large volumes of data will allow them to crack some of those issues, so 
they’ve all got to that first base’ (Informant 4). In practice, most informants found 
integrating BD resources and developing the necessary capabilities to be complex.  
The secondary data reinforced this point, suggesting that organisations do not have 
the capabilities to store, manage and analyse BD. A lack of awareness that using BD as 
a capability or a tool has the potential to improve their decisions, means that some 
companies ‘will find themselves in trouble with some stakeholders’ (Informant 6). The 
cognitive capabilities which underpin these dynamic capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2015) emerged as a critical theme. Several directors spoke intently of the demands BD 
made on board members’ cognitive capabilities. As this director explains, more time is 
needed to learn about and embrace the changes arising from BD, ‘There is also learning 
in terms of a learning curve which organisations have to go through... I have to go 
through… my team has to go through’ (Informant 11). 
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We identified three interlinked sub-themes of cognitive capability that impact on 
strategic decision-making. The first sub-theme refers to a shortfall in cognitive 
capabilities on BD; the second to cognitive biases that are a consequence, and the third 
to the cognitive overload that can arise. The linkages between these sub-themes occur 
when a shortfall in cognitive capabilities (‘the capacity of individual managers to 
perform mental activities’, Helfat & Peteraf, 2015, p. 832) leads to cognitive bias 
(Brennan, 2016), a situation that is often compounded by being overwhelmed with data.  
Shortfall in cognitive capability. Starting with the cognitive capability shortfall, we 
found the required technical capabilities, and those needed to integrate, build and 
reconfigure the necessary internal and external competencies to use the data, were often 
absent. Although the basic principle of using data to inform decision-making has not 
changed, ‘What’s available has increased, and the number of sources has increased, 
and that requires a more sophisticated set of skills to sort and prioritise’ (Informant 
13). While informants recognised the data’s potential, many felt personally ill-equipped 
to deal with it, as this director reflects, ‘The solution really is being able to mine and 
get the insights out of all of that, and that again, is quite a technical activity and it 
requires heavy duty analytics’ (Informant 8). Their concerns extended beyond the 
technical in order to ‘get the most out of this more complex world’ (Informant 18). Some 
mentioned the different world view of a new generation that has grown up with digital. 
One informant compared this generation’s way of thinking with the non-linear way in 
which boards make decisions:  
… pretty much all of us are very linear in the way that we think of information so 
we tell stories and we go from A to Z, everything we do is about having a 
beginning, a middle and an end … It’s how we’ve been educated, it’s how we 
process information and it’s how we strategically think and therefore deliver a 
result. Increasingly we’re seeing the emergence of a generation who are non-
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linear in the way that they operate … if I’m talking to a ten-year-old, they’re not 
necessarily interested in the story of Red Riding Hood and particularly interested 
in the outcome of the story, they might be interested in the world of Little Red 
Riding Hood, in which they would like to immerse themselves. (Informant 12) 
 
There was a sense that in comparison to what could be possible, organisations are 
‘…incredibly slow at adopting new data inputs’ and that while ‘…there’s been a 
massive growth throughout the planet of availability, it [is] growing much faster than 
the ability to analyse it’ (Informant 1). Therefore, several informants recognised, ‘the 
need of overcoming - and that was very much the primary focus’ the constraint to which 
a shortfall of capability may lead (Informant 20). 
Cognitive biases. Regarding cognitive biases, we found evidence of anchoring, in 
which old ways of thinking inhibited the decision-making process; and of poor 
understanding of BD. A corporate decision-maker admitted that, ‘there’s always this 
scepticism about how information and data is used […] and I can understand there’s 
an element of caution’ (Informant 18). Reflecting on some of his client organisations, 
one IT consultant explained, ‘We’ll go and speak to the execs and we’ll get their view 
of what’s going on in their business and then we’ll go back to the data and then we’ll 
prove what’s going on in their business with the data and say, did you know that out of 
the 400 hypotheses you had knocking around about your business, only 50 of them were 
true?’ (Informant 9). He went on to explain, ‘…you suddenly know whether you’re 
talking to a bunch of people that truly have their finger on the pulse of what’s driving 
their business, or whether they’re in “cloud cuckoo land”’.   
Sometimes these problems emerged because of previous common practice of only 
sharing simple synopses of data with the board. One director used the term ‘instructed 
data’ to describe this format, explaining that, ‘Big Data may well be being used within 
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the organisation … because of this channelling effect as you go towards the top, and 
simplification … I'm not sure that the boards ever really get to grips with Big Data’ 
(Informant 3). 
Cognitive overload. We found cognitive overload occurs when individuals are 
exposed to more information than they are able to process (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). 
As one director explained, ‘I don’t think you’ve got enough hours in a day to solve these 
problems’ (Informant 7), because ‘we still have an overload of data […] and sometimes 
less data is better than more data’ (Informant 16). We found strong evidence of this 
overload’s consequences for strategic decision-making. Informants referred to BD’s 
‘immediacy … and … interactivity’ (Informant 14); and of the challenges information 
overload can bring, including ‘perhaps having too much of it [BD] to really be able to 
analyse effectively’ (Informant 8). One director argued that ‘the people who are doing 
well are the ones that can cut through all the crap and make decisions based on facts’ 
(Informant 13). Another reflected on the challenges and opportunities that access to so 
much data could bring:  
So go back 20 years … data availability was very different. So, insight and 
targeting in those days will depend on greater personal knowledge of markets, 
geographies... You used to rely on the person and their knowledge and ability. 
Today you’ve got a huge amount of data but not necessarily more insight unless 
you try very hard. (Informant 11) 
 
This quote highlights a recurring point, that BD does not necessarily lead to good 
quality insight. Even those who commented positively about its potential to yield 
insights were cautious: 
So the digital technology has changed or enhanced the amount of data and 
information that is available now. Doesn’t necessarily mean the quality of 
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insight is improving, because those two are slightly different things … But 
more data is available, therefore, the decision-making process is more 
based… can be based, on better quality information, more robust information, 
as opposed to having to guess what is going on. (Informant 11) 
 
While informants noted a ‘danger that even vast BD could be incomplete’, on other 
occasions there was ‘too much of it to really be able to analyse effectively’ (Informant 
8). Whatever the cause, overcoming this overload was seen as crucial to leveraging the 
insight needed to support strategic decision-making. 
 
4.2. Second core category: board cohesion 
We found strong evidence of BD disrupting the cohesive dynamics of board-level 
decision-making, with implications for the required dynamic and adaptive capabilities. 
At the heart of this disruption was the view that fundamental shifts in the board’s ways 
of working are required. A perceived clash between old and new ways of working, 
leading to tension, is evident. Insights gained from secondary data supported this 
finding: some companies admit to having obsolete internal information technology 
systems that do not perform as expected, resulting in business disruption, processing 
inefficiencies and loss of stakeholders. These sources tended not to indicate remedial 
action to plan to address these information technology systems’ issues. In our primary 
data we found two particular sets of temporal issues associated with decision-making 
disruption. The first concerns a clash in pace between the high velocity of BD and the 
typically lower speed of strategic decision-making. The second reflects a mismatch 
between forward-looking strategic decision-making and BD, that focuses on the past 
and the present. A further set of issues arises in relation to the board’s make-up and its 
suitability for operating in this disrupted environment.  
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Decision-making disruption. We found strong evidence of BD disrupting the 
strategic decision-making process, leading to anxiety about the impact for the 
organisation and worries from individuals about their personal preparedness:  
We frequently come across situations where there are big variances in data; because 
measuring stuff is complicated; it’s really tough sometimes. Even in the simplest 
scenario often things go a little bit wrong and you could be making poor decisions. 
(Informant 17)  
 
A different director also spoke about the ‘human side of this problem’ (Informant 
7), explaining a situation in which there was, ‘No integration of technology, no 
integration of databases, but lots of very rich middle-aged men [on the board], clinging 
onto their very important jobs for dear life’. While another commented that this was 
evident within particular domains of management, stating, ‘traditional marketing is … 
a bit stuck in the heritage corner where you see … many old-school Marketing 
Directors really struggling with the new digital world’ (Informant 14). 
The uncertainty facing firms was widely felt, as was the recognition that boards are 
struggling ‘to change their organisations as quickly as they need to’ (Informant 7). 
Many were facing up to ‘a time of real change, a time when the whole market’s 
changing the way it buys and thinks about things’ (Informant 13). Balancing the need 
for BD to become integral to how organisations operate, while managing uncertainty 
during these times, was a recurring issue:  
Clients can’t pause their companies …we assume there’s a moment in time, 
when someone goes: ‘I’ve got it. I’m going to change my company and I’m 
going to put my company on pause, and everything is going to be fine’. But, of 
course, they can’t because the next second, they need to sell something using 
the existing system and existing organisation. (Informant 7) 
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Temporal issues. Starting with the first temporal clash, informants acknowledged 
the speed of BD and welcomed the capacity to do things faster, ‘…we’ve done projects 
before now within six weeks, end-to-end – so go in, get the data, put into a platform, 
play about with it with analytics, segment the database, come up with a cluster 
segmentation, then build some models, and … test them in six weeks’ (Informant 9). 
The additional benefits of being able to capture insight in the present rather than post 
hoc were also mentioned. Indeed, another informant reiterated this made it possible to 
‘…see things happening as [they’re] happening, as opposed to watching history’ 
(Informant 4). There was, however, a perceived mismatch between BD velocity and the 
capacity to respond quickly, reflecting a view that, ‘…the market doesn’t work on that 
timeline’ (Informant 9), thus again evidencing a danger of the data ‘growing much 
faster than the ability to analyse it’ (Informant 1).  
Organisations responded to these tensions using various short- and long-term fixes. 
In the short term, being realistic about what BD could achieve was deemed important. 
Balancing the need to ‘…move from the mentality … that digital will substitute face-to-
face towards [a view that] digital will augment this face-to-face experience’ (Informant 
10), was one way to manage. Informants spoke about using social media insights to 
make regular and minor modifications to their existing targeting strategy. 
Consequently, using BD in ways that align naturally with existing practices helped to 
smooth its integration. For example, the director of a food business – which routinely 
seeks feedback on new products – highlighted enhancements to the process using digital 
media, ‘In two weeks I’ve got 50 videos on how consumers have used the product, what 
they think, what they like, what they don’t’ (Informant 11).  
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Moving to the second time-based clash, although BD can also capture past or 
present insights about a variety of phenomena, our data show a tension with strategy-
making which is future-focused, ‘It’s a hindsight thing, and strategy is a foresight and 
intuitive thing’ (Informant 3). We found evidence that this led to confusion about when 
a decision should finally be fixed, partly because of the perceived need to ‘continually 
go back to the data, trying to understand what it was saying now’ (Informant 13). 
Board composition issues. Many informants were acutely conscious of not having 
grown up with Big Data, regarding it as the domain of ‘tech happy people’ in their 20s 
or 30s. In contrast, ‘very few board members [are] under the age of 45 or 50’ (Informant 
2), with many firms seen as ‘focused on 1980s principles’ (Informant 13). Even so, the 
need for boards to take responsibility in the face of these challenges was clearly evident, 
as was the need to remain pragmatic: 
Boards cannot absolve themselves of responsibilities, of understanding their 
business, their market, and the decisions they need to make … because in the 
end all Big Data gives them is a slight move, if you like, from 40%, to 50%, 
60%... they’ll never get beyond the 70%. So I think all that Big Data does, if 
you want to be brutally honest about it, is move you faster and closer to the 
70%, you still have to make a decision based on imperfect information. 
(Informant 3) 
 
This view was tempered by scepticism about the extent to which BD will change 
existing practices, as the following director commented, ‘I don’t see anyone holistically 
changing their entire organisation, as a result of data’ (Informant 7). Another 
explained: 
I'm not sure how having this huge knowledge bank of information will absolve 
or make it a great deal easier in making some of these big strategic decision; 
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you're still going to have to bring your own intelligence, interpretation, your 
own views on the future. (Informant 3)  
 
Several others felt that irrespective of the advances in BD, the rational process of 
making decisions remains largely unaltered; BD was not considered to be a strategic 
panacea. One informant spoke of still needing ‘decision-making [that] is … logical and 
pragmatic’ (Informant 13); while others saw the board occupying a position hovering 
above and, to some extent separate, from BD issues: 
… a lot of the CEOs and FDs that we know … they see themselves as making 
decisions standing back from all the noise and saying, we sit above this, we 
can see all this data coming in, we’ve got to make sure we just don’t go down 
the wrong route. (Informant 1) 
What I observe is that organisational politics at the highest level in companies 
are what drive it and it's who trusts whom, and what the agendas are. I think 
if you look at the very top. I don’t think that's changed that much at all. 
(Informant 13) 
 
Among the suggested solutions for tackling these difficulties, were the creation of 
new directorships, recruitment of those with suitable technical skills, restructuring of 
the board, or outsourcing BD to ensure the necessary data resource and technical 
capabilities were in place. This finding links to our third core category of Responsibility 
and Control.  
 
4.3. Third core category: responsibility and control 
Our data evidence the ways in which boards seek to re-configure themselves as 
well as their relationships with key stakeholders as a response to the decision-making 
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demands BD placed upon them. This finding is confirmed by secondary data, in which 
some companies predict that new cross-industry partnerships will be established to 
benefit from the added value of big data. Some corporates are therefore failing to seize 
the opportunity that BD offers to improve their internal structure and to more effectively 
liaise with key stakeholders. This raises questions which highlight and potentially re-
frame longstanding issues directly related to the board’s responsibility and degree of 
organisational control. Two sub-themes emerge in relation to this issue. The first 
revolves around attempts to break-down existing functional ‘silos’; sometimes and 
most notably accompanied by the establishment of sub-groups or sub-boards. The 
second relates to the outsourcing of responsibilities while working with external 
stakeholders. Both themes highlight significant implications for strategic decision-
making.  
 
The organisational impact of sub-group formulation. The impact of sub-group 
formulation emerged as a prominent finding within our data. While informants did not 
suggest that boards are holistically changing the structures of their entire organisations 
as a direct result of BD, many commented on the need to create new senior roles to 
make the necessary connections during this transformational period. As one informant 
noted, ‘there’s a route to the board that … we’ve seen Chief Science Officers, Chief 
Data Science Officers, Chief Analytical Officer emerging in organisations’ (Informant 
9). Indeed, secondary data confirms that a few companies are hiring new experts in BD 
in order to develop new technology and design innovative BD infrastructure. These 
new employees are typically in senior management roles located within a big data team 
that is likely to support board decision-making. When explaining this development, 
informants particularly noted that, ‘the technology [involved in processing BD] … 
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determines what is possible and, therefore, the creativity [lies] within the constraints 
of technology in a way that it was less so in the past’ (Informant 8). This effect is having 
a major impact upon how the board functions and responds to the assimilation of 
knowledge acquired through the interpretation of BD. For example, as another 
informant explained: 
[bringing] a different set of people into the business [provides] no visibility of 
how a business operates. All they understand is the part of the organisation 
they’ve built … [and yet] those people with that business knowledge, they’re 
the people that are actually the powerful people. (Informant 9)  
 
This respondent suggested that the damaging consequences of these actions 
throughout middle-management teams were apparent, using the following illustration, 
‘This is basically going to make the guy in ops look bad, so I need to … inform him this 
is what’s happened and we need to work out a joint messaging strategy, so that when 
he’s in the room he doesn’t stand up and challenge what we’ve done’ (Informant 9). 
 
The problems raised by these developments are seldom documented in academic 
research at the board level, but the strategic implications are clearly exposed; something 
which informants were quick to signpost as a destructive impact of the board’s 
response:  
They’ve got someone called Head of Customer, but everyone else reports into 
the Sales Director, so she’s Head of Customer and the Sales Director then has 
Marketing, Shops, IT, Product all reporting to him… That’s not going to work. 
They’ve done it, so they’ve appointed someone, but they haven’t changed the 
organisation, so they all sit cross-armed, and she will probably leave after a 
year and a half, and then they’ll get another one. (Informant 7) 
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External stakeholders. The second sub-theme, which underpins the core category 
of responsibility and control, exposes a trend towards the outsourcing of resource to 
external stakeholders. A number of informants, through their roles providing external 
consultancy support, felt that their clients depended heavily on these outsourcing 
relationships. Perhaps more importantly, as the following comment highlights, boards 
may be losing control of their influence over the firm’s strategic direction as a result, 
‘When it comes to the board … they totally rely on us [external BD provider]!’ 
(Informant 4). Reinforcing this position, another informant added: 
I suspect a lot of boards are very reliant on consultancy advice actually and 
are probably getting information second-hand. You can’t particularly blame 
the board directors for that because it’s not their area of expertise, and that 
adds to risk …  And it does strike me that the people running business are in 
quite a weak position and not always often able to embrace some of these 
changes. (Informant 2) 
 
In this respect, our data reveal the involvement of a broad range of stakeholders in 
shaping how BD is transforming learning and action, particularly regarding how those 
decisions are made. An informant admitted that, ‘what I’ve learnt over the last few 
weeks is that you have to go back and engage with that audience and you need to show 
them the successes that you’ve achieved’ (Informant 19). Organisations ground many 
of their beliefs about the ways that BD might be used by observing other industry 
players. As one informant noted, ‘We’ve nicked a few ideas from other distributors that 
were doing quirky things…’ (Informant 15). Organisations often recruit experts from 
other firms as a way of building their capabilities. They often rely on third parties: firms 
which already have the required resources to support them. These trends highlight the 
27 
 
important distinction between BD (i.e. data as a resource) and the organisation’s 
analytics capabilities, as the following informant suggests:  
I’m talking about them having the resources to analyse the BD that they get 
from the data crunchers, because gathering, shaping, analysing, or rather, 
presenting the results of BD, seems to be the preserve of outsourced 
organisations. (Informant 3) 
 
Such an approach does not evolve without concerns for many organisations; not 
least, as one informant suggests, regarding whether sharing data is tantamount to giving 
information away, ‘They’re worried about … giving away intellectual property’ 
(Informant 4). One informant involved in gathering data on behalf of clients elaborates:  
We’ve got to the point now where we’re using their model on our machines 
with our data, rather than us giving our data to them to run on their machines. 
But that issue of potentially inhibiting our independence has been, I think, the 
biggest stumbling block for us to think about. Why we would partner with 
someone else? (Informant 6) 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
In this empirical paper, we set out to explore whether BD has changed the process 
of board level decision-making and, if so, how and to what extent. The study contributes 
to knowledge by pointing to areas for development relating to the core categories at 
each of the three levels of our analysis. At the level of the individual directors, we 
identify a gap in the cognitive capabilities that organisations possess to cope with BD; 
capabilities that are crucial in avoiding the cognitive biases and overloads to which BD 
can contribute. Second, at the level of the board itself, we find board cohesion is 
disrupted by BD, which has consequences for the decision-making process itself. As 
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directors struggle to introduce changes within the shortened timescales created by an 
ever-changing backdrop of new data, they are under pressure to adapt the way strategic 
decisions are made. Third, taking a holistic view of BD’s impact that encompasses the 
whole organisation and its external stakeholders, we find boards seeking new ways of 
working that cut across traditional ‘silos’, such as through the introduction of sub-
boards, and relying upon the capabilities of third parties to help handle BD. These three 
points highlight a shortfall in capabilities for dealing with the challenges of BD. Boards 
therefore need to develop their cognitive capabilities at an individual level; find new 
ways to make strategic decisions to meet the temporal and other challenges BD brings; 
and work in new ways, both across the organisation and with external stakeholders who 
have valuable BD capabilities. In the remainder of this section we explore each of these 
issues in more detail. 
First, we note that our theoretical approach, drawing on a capabilities perspective 
and the KBV, played an important role in this study. This perspective was particularly 
suitable in helping the researchers to make sense of our findings, which can be 
summarised as referring to a need and appetite for new capabilities; explaining the 
impact of excess knowledge and information on the strategic decision-making process; 
and highlighting how BD can provide opportunities to enhance firms’ adaptive 
capabilities. The KBV implies that the more knowledge the organisation possesses, the 
greater the opportunity to maximise competitive advantage. By supporting the KBV 
approach with the concepts of dynamic and cognitive capabilities, we reveal the need 
to develop a wide range of abilities to respond rapidly to the changing environment 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). However, while the KBV 
suggests knowledge is a vital resource (Leonard, 2011; Grant, 1996) that depends on 
the amount of (big) data and information a decision-maker can obtain (Zahra & 
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Filatotchev, 2004), it does not explain the impact of excess knowledge and information. 
In relation to our first research question to explore the impact of BD for individual 
directors, our results show a potential negative impact on capabilities with particular 
consequences for individual directors, where an excess of data causes a ‘cognitive 
overload’ for the board. Such ‘cognitive overload’ can lead to ‘information overload’, 
with the result that an excessive level of information does not necessary yield improved 
competitive advantage because decision-makers are unable to process significant 
amounts of the data. 
In the context of the KBV, dynamic capabilities allow a company to modify 
resources to respond quickly to environmental changes (Côrte-Real et al., 2016). Helfat 
and Peteraf (2015) find that cognitive capabilities explain why some corporate decision-
makers have more effective capabilities than others in this respect. However, the way 
knowledge is used to anticipate and respond to an evolving BD environment remains 
unclear. Our results suggest that decision-makers use BD as a knowledge source in 
different ways. Some board directors appeared not to recognise the value of BD as a 
resource or have the necessary in-house analytical skills to manipulate it, with the result 
that they did not have a key role for BD in the firm’s decision-making process. In other 
instances, such as where directors could see BD’s potential to add value through the 
provision of new knowledge about the firm’s environment, the benefit of having up-to-
date information was more likely to be acknowledged. In the latter case BD is seen to 
occupy a pivotal position, in that it has a direct relationship with the firm’s decision-
making processes, with the potential to transform the ways in which the organisation 
functions.  
Moving on to our second research question which sought to establish BD’s impact 
on how the board works, we found several ways in which there was potential to 
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transform corporate governance processes and organisational decision-making (Fosso 
Wamba et al., 2015; Janssen et al., 2017). First, as well as triggering the capabilities of 
individual directors (Erevelles et al., 2016; Côrte-Real et al., 2016), we found BD 
becomes part of the set of capabilities that a company and decision-makers need to be 
successful (Braganza et al., 2017). The findings therefore show that as a potential 
source of knowledge BD should be influencing both the dynamic capabilities of the 
board and the wider organisation, as well as the cognitive capabilities of the individual 
directors. Regarding organisational functioning, in order to efficiently utilise BD, we 
suggest firms will benefit from strong internal co-ordination and integration, along with 
a common BD culture amongst decision-makers. In some instances, we found 
organisations responding to the challenges of BD with inertia; but we also saw 
examples of positive in-house responses (i.e. building internal capabilities) and of 
seeking to work with external stakeholders (i.e. outsourcing selected BD activities). 
The speed at which decisions need to be made within a BD context places further 
pressure on the process. Nonaka (1994) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) use the term 
“spiral” to describe a four-stage dynamic, interconnected process of knowledge 
conversion, termed socialisation, internalisation, combination and externalisation. 
Considering BD in this light, while the levels of knowledge these authors identify 
(individual, group, organisation and inter-organisation) are clearly reflected in our 
analysis, the issues of time pressures that were so strongly expressed are not explicitly 
addressed in detail in the KBV literature. Organisations that can build the capabilities 
to make strategic decisions rapidly and embrace the tensions that can arise from creating 
forward-looking strategies while reviewing backward-looking data, are more likely to 
make effective progress with BD. 
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Turning to our third research question addressing BD’s wider impact on the 
organisation and its external stakeholders, we observed changes in how, and with 
whom, boards are working. These changes indicate that firms need to proactively 
address changes in their external environment; including using signals from 
stakeholders (Erevelles et al., 2016) to predict changes in current needs (adaptive 
capability) and possible future demands (Day, 2011; 2014). When successfully applied, 
BD provides opportunities to enhance firms’ adaptive capability. Within the KBV 
theoretical framework, however, it is still unclear how the interaction with stakeholders 
supports the creation of resources and building of capabilities. We suggest that the 
activities of key stakeholders such as competitors can encourage firms to develop new 
capabilities in using BD. There is certainly evidence that stakeholders such as 
consultancy companies and digital experts can provide additional external resources to 
support decision-making in focal firms. Policy-makers and other stakeholders may be 
able to educate companies about BD’s role in improving the speed and efficiency of 
decision-making. Therefore, we argue that organisations adopting a stakeholder-
oriented view may find these relationships an important resource for achieving and 
sustaining knowledge-based advantage. With the increasing importance of knowledge-
based capabilities, we suggest coping effectively with stakeholders with the power to 
incentivise firms to develop additional knowledge, is fundamental. 
 
6. Limitations and a future research agenda 
This study is based on rich data gleaned from lengthy interviews gathered at board 
level in a range of UK-based, global organisations. A distinctive feature of the paper is 
a rich dataset, based on a senior level of organisational access, that has helped us to 
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unpack complex issues surrounding how strategic decisions are made by boards and 
how directors respond to the challenges which arise as a consequence.  
While this research provides important insights into BD and the decision-making 
process, the findings should be considered in the light of the limitations of the study. 
First, being a qualitative study, the generalisability of the outputs is limited given the 
nature of the sample (e.g. Musteen, 2016). We also note that, as in any qualitative study 
based on interviews, our respondents may have a personal agenda (e.g. Jakobsson & 
Akerstrom, 2013). However, the generalisability of our findings is not a quantifiable 
intention of this study; and our approach is theoretically and methodologically 
consistent with the nature of the research problem, which requires in-depth insight into 
a complex real-world situation. 
Our findings contribute a cross-sectional view of the problem, and we therefore 
suggest that further research should examine the differing impacts of BD on board level 
decision-making across a range of firm types and industry sectors. Our research also 
reveals that there is scope for a more nuanced understanding of the extent to which the 
findings are influenced by contextual factors such as firm size and industry, and the 
nature of the business and of the strategic decisions taken. In this vein, future research 
could further unpack the relationships between BD’s growth and the corporate 
governance processes of affected organisations. Longitudinal case studies, for example, 
could paint a richer picture of the developments in some organisations to build their 
cognitive and dynamic capabilities, to respond to the temporal challenges of strategic 
decisions in the BD era, and to work effectively with external stakeholders to address 
gaps in internal resources and capabilities. Such studies could further enhance the 
contribution of this research, which has adopted the perspective of capabilities and the 
KBV to explain why and how directors and the board, in an era of BD, should develop 
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a wide range of capabilities to rapidly respond to environmental changes while 
anticipating stakeholder needs. Our contribution at all three levels – individual 
directors, the board and the organisation/stakeholder – are worthy of further 
investigation. 
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Appendix A: Semi-Structured Key-Informant Interview Template 
Research Question: 
Has ‘Big Data’ changed the process of board level decision-making, and if so how and 
to what extent?  
 
1. Project Background  
 Informants to be given an explanation of the project, focusing on brief background 
and aims  
 
2. Respondent Background  
 Their current/previous roles/remits. 
 Their board-level experiences.  
 
3. The Context of ‘Big Data’ 
 Are there differences between sectors in the use of the data? 
 Does organisational size matter?  
 Does having access to a lot of data provide competitive advantage? Or is what 
matters how organisations use the data they gather? 
 Do boards find it difficult to become ‘tech savvy’ and if so, why? 
 Does data force you to look backward more than it does forward in decision-
making? 
 ‘Big Data’ is constantly streaming; is a danger of losing the overall narrative 
(strategy)? 
 
4. Complexity and Uncertainty 
 Does digitisation (and all data in electronic form and easily accessible): 
o Increase or reduce uncertainty? 
o Reduce the likelihood that decision may go wrong? 
o Increase/Decrease the number of alternatives considered? 
o Increase/Decrease the number/diversity of stakeholders involved? 
o Increase/Decrease the influence of internal/external stakeholders? 
o Allow greater intervention into the process by stakeholders? 
o Increase/Decrease confidence in information sources? 
o Increase political infighting as different factions fight their corner with greater 
amounts of information? 
 
5. Reflecting on the Decision-Making Process 
 Does ‘Big Data’: 
o Speed up/slow down the time it takes to make a decision (authorisation and 
implementation)? 
o Mean there are more re-cycles and re-visiting of problems? 
o Make the process more or less formal/restricted to senior management teams? 
o Make the decision process more fluid and continuous? 
o Vary from decision to decision – i.e. some decisions use digital data to a much 
greater extent than others? Can you give an example? 
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 In what ways have the insights used in decision-making changed? For example, the 
types of data used, data providers, providers of analytics, and the parties involved 
in providing these insights.  
 
6. Reflecting on the Governance Process  
 Does ‘Big Data’: 
o Mean the Board works more effectively and efficiently? 
o Put greater demands on the Board to examine and analyse information? 
o Help or hinder competitor analysis? 
o Reduce the incidence of hunches and gut feel? 
o Increase or decrease accountability of the board/top team? 
o Influence the kinds of directors who are elected to the board (e.g. execs and non-
execs)? 
 
7. Closing Questions  
 Which other organisations are driving the agenda in this area? 
 Who else should we contact? 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Informants and Organisations 
Informant Informants’ 
Role 
Company Details Sector 
Informant 1, 
Company A 
Senior Manager Independent consultancy 
company in corporate, 
institutional, wealth 
management and corporate 
sectors. Turnover: over £310k 
(2016). No. of employees: 
less than 50 (2016). 
Consultancy 
Informant 2, 
Company A 
Consulting 
Director 
Informant 3, 
Company B 
Executive 
Director in 
Marketing, 
Sales, Strategy 
and 
Commercial  
A leading learning and 
development supplier. 
Turnover: over £24m (2015). 
No. of employees: over 270 
(2015). 
Professional 
and Technology 
services 
Informant 4, 
Company C 
Chairman Leading landscape 
intelligence analytics 
company. Turnover: over 
£1.9m (2016). No. of 
employees: less than 50 
(2016). 
Database 
Software 
Informant 5, 
Company D 
Managing 
Director 
Insurance brokers for 
commercial and private 
customers. Turnover: £320K 
(2016). No. of employees: 
less than 50 (2016). 
Insurance 
Broker 
Informant 6, 
Company E 
Director of 
Marketing 
Large gambling and gaming 
business. Turnover: £1.6bn 
(2015). No. of employees: 
over 16,000 (2016). 
Gambling 
Informant 7, 
Company F 
CEO  Worldwide leader in 
professional services. 
Turnover: over £ 23bn (2016). 
No. of employees: over 
230,000 (2016). 
Professional 
Services 
Informant 8, 
Company G 
CEO One of the world’s leading 
marketing agencies. Turnover: 
over £12bn. (2015). No. of 
employees: almost 190,000 
(2015). 
Advertising and 
Public relations  
Informant 9, 
Company H 
Senior Manager Global agency specialising in 
strategy, consulting, digital 
and technology services. 
Turnover: £26.73 bn. (2016). 
No of employees: 394,000 
(2016).  
Professional 
and Technology 
services 
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Informant 
10, 
Company I 
Senior VP 
Marketing 
One of the top five European 
insurance businesses. 
Turnover: over £80bn. (2015). 
No. of employees: over 
142,000 (2015). 
Financial 
services 
Informant 
11, 
Company J 
Chief Marketing 
Officer 
Leading food manufacturer. 
Turnover: over £106m (2015). 
No. of employees: over 250 
(2015). 
Food and 
beverages 
Informant 
12, 
Company K 
Co-founder and 
Head of Insight 
Leading futurologists and 
trend forecasters in the UK, 
with operations in North 
America and Europe. 
Turnover: over £7.7m (2015). 
No. of employees: less than 
50 (2015). 
Professional 
and Technology 
services 
Informant 
13, 
Company L 
Head of 
Marketing for 
Cloud and 
Strategic 
Solutions 
Top 5 global IT services 
provider, operating in 100 
countries. Turnover: over 
£30bn. (2015). No of 
employees: over 150,000, of 
which 14,000 in the UK 
(2015). 
Computer and 
IT 
Informant 
14, 
Company M 
Global Head of 
Data and 
Sciences 
One of the top five global 
market research organisations. 
Turnover: over £ 1.2bn 
(2016). No of employees: 
over 13,000 (2016). 
Market 
Research 
Informant 
15, 
Company N 
General 
Manager 
Global software provider with 
over 150 distributors and sales 
offices. Parent company 
turnover: £21billion (2016). 
No. of employees: over 
160,000 (2016). 
Industrial 
software 
Informant 
16, 
Company O 
Head of New 
Propositions and 
Strategy 
One of the biggest phone 
retailers in Europe. Turnover 
in the UK: £2.9bn (2016). No 
of employees: 42,000 in 11 
countries (2016). 
Telecommunica
tion 
Informant 
17, 
Company P 
Head of 
Marketing  
 
Global Digital Agency 
operating in Europe, US and 
South Africa. Turnover: £38m 
(2016). No. of employees: 
over 500 (2016). 
Professional 
and Technology 
services 
Informant 
18,  
Company R 
Head of UK 
Business 
Development 
 
One of the largest producers 
of transformer oils and 
bitumen for paving and 
industrial purposes. Turnover: 
£ 15bn. (2016). No. of 
employees: over 900 (2016). 
Oil and Gas 
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Informant 
19,  
Company S 
Head of 
Business 
Development 
Leading manufacturer of 
building materials. Turnover: 
£ 4.4m (2015). No. of 
employees: over 500 (2015). 
Manufacturing 
Informant 
20,  
Company T 
Propositions and 
Marketing 
Director 
One of the largest business 
process outsourcing and 
professional services. 
Turnover: £ 4.8 (2016). No. of 
employees: over 70,000 
(2016). 
Professional 
services 
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Table 2. Sub-Themes and Core Categories 
Example Quotations Sub-Themes Core Categories 
 “What’s available has increased, and 
the number of sources has increased, 
and that requires a more sophisticated 
set of skills to sort and prioritise.” 
 
Shortfall in cognitive 
capability 
(88 quotations) 
Cognitive 
capabilities 
(177 quotations) 
 “…you suddenly know whether you’re 
talking to a bunch of people that truly 
have their finger on the pulse of what’s 
driving their business, or whether 
they’re in ‘cloud cuckoo land’.” 
 “I'm not sure that the boards ever 
really get to grips with Big Data.” 
Cognitive biases 
(58 quotations) 
 “I don’t think you’ve got enough hours 
in a day to solve these problems.” 
 “There is too much of it [BD] to really 
be able to analyse effectively.” 
Cognitive overload 
(31 quotations) 
 “They start panicking at that point and 
hyperventilating, because the 
organisational change that’s required 
for them to get that done is huge,” 
 “No integration of technology, no 
integration of database, but lots of very 
rich middle-aged men [on the board], 
clinging onto their very important jobs 
for dear life.” 
Decision-making 
disruption 
(53 quotations) 
Board cohesion (113 
quotations) 
 “…the market doesn’t work on that 
timeline.” 
 BD is “growing much faster than the 
ability to analyse it.” 
Temporal issues 
(39 quotations) 
 “I don’t see anyone holistically 
changing their entire organisation, as 
a result of data.” 
 “I'm not sure how having this huge 
knowledge bank of information will 
absolve or make it a great deal easier 
in making some of these big strategic 
decisions.” 
Board composition issues 
(21 quotations) 
 “…they haven’t changed the 
organisation, so they all sit cross-
armed, and she will probably leave 
after a year and a half, and then they’ll 
get another one.” 
Organisational impact of 
sub-groups 
(24 quotations) 
Responsibility and 
control 
(85 quotations) 
 “When it comes to the board … they 
totally rely on us [external BD 
provider].” 
 “They’re worried about … giving 
away intellectual property.” 
External stakeholders 
(61 quotations) 
 
 
